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Abstract 
Event-based prospective memory (PM) tasks require participants to substitute an atypical PM 
response for an ongoing task response when presented with PM targets. Responses to ongoing 
tasks are often slower with the addition of PM demands (“PM costs”). Prominent PM theories 
attribute costs to capacity-sharing between the ongoing and PM tasks, which reduces the rate of 
processing of the ongoing task. We modelled PM costs using the Linear Ballistic Accumulator 
and the Diffusion Decision Model in a lexical decision task with non-focal PM targets defined by 
semantic categories. Previous decision modelling, which attributed costs to changes in caution 
rather than rate of processing (Heathcote et al., 2015; Horn & Bayen, 2015), could be criticised 
on the grounds that the PM tasks included did not sufficiently promote capacity-sharing. Our 
semantic PM task was potentially more dependent on lexical decision resources than previous 
tasks (Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2005), yet costs were again driven by changes in threshold and not 
by changes in processing speed (drift rate). Costs resulting from a single target focal PM task 
were also driven by threshold changes. The increased thresholds underlying non-focal and focal 
costs were larger for word trials than non-word trials. As PM targets were always words, this 
suggests that threshold increases are used to extend the time available for retrieval on PM trials. 
Under non-focal conditions, but not focal conditions, the non-word threshold also increased. 
Thus, it seems that only non-focal instructions cause a global threshold increase due to greater 
perceived task complexity. 
 
Keywords: prospective memory, costs, delay theory, linear ballistic accumulator model, 
diffusion model   
                                                ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE ABOUT PM COSTS 3 
 
In our everyday lives we often need to remember to perform an intended action when we 
next encounter an environmental cue (e.g., pass on a message to a co-worker), a requirement 
referred to as event-based prospective memory (PM). Event-based PM has traditionally been 
examined in the laboratory using the Einstein and McDaniel (1990) paradigm, where participants 
perform an ongoing task (e.g., a lexical decision task), and try to remember to make an 
alternative (PM) response when a target event is presented in the ongoing task (e.g., when a letter 
string contains a certain syllable). In these paradigms target trials, on which the stimulus is a PM 
target and the PM response is required, are relatively infrequent and interspersed amongst non-
target trials, on which the stimulus is not a PM target and an ongoing task response is required.  
Average response times (RTs) to non-target trials are often longer in blocks where 
participants have a PM task, versus control blocks with no PM task (Smith, 2003). This slowing 
is referred to as the PM cost. Costs are common for tasks in which making ongoing task 
decisions does not require processing information about the stimuli relevant to the PM task, 
referred to as non-focal PM tasks (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005). For example, detecting target 
members of a semantic category (e.g., animal) is non-focal to ongoing lexical decision making, 
because deciding whether a letter string is present in the mental lexicon does not require 
knowledge of the semantic categories to which the word belongs. An example of a focal PM task 
is to respond to a specific PM target word if presented during a lexical decision task (Einstein & 
McDaniel, 2005), because in this case the identity of the target word is part of the analysis 
required for the ongoing task. Focal PM costs are not always found and when they are present 
they are smaller than non-focal PM costs (Einstein et al., 2005).  
Several theories of PM, such as the Preparatory Attentional and Memory Processes (PAM) 
theory (Smith, 2010), and the Multiprocess view (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005), assume that PM 
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costs occur because a proportion of an individual’s available capacity is allocated away from the 
ongoing task and towards the PM task. We refer to these as capacity-sharing theories of PM 
costs to emphasize that the costs result from the division of capacity between the two tasks 
during stimulus processing. The empirical basis of capacity-sharing theories is slowing of mean 
correct RTs as a function of imposed PM task demands. The problem with this approach is that 
analysing mean RTs alone omits crucial information contained in the shape of the RT 
distributions and in error rates, which can indicate whether participants are trading speed for 
accuracy. This is compounded by the fact that most PM studies report near-ceiling ongoing task 
accuracy, where a significant change in speed could easily trade for a non-significant change in 
accuracy. This makes it impossible to unambiguously attribute elevated RTs for the ongoing task 
in the PM condition to capacity-sharing. Elevated RTs could equally result from changes in other 
aspects of the decision process, such as the amount of evidence required to trigger a response.  
Indeed, Loft and Remington (2013) proposed an alternative to capacity-sharing theories that 
predicts PM costs can result from increased response thresholds. Heathcote, Loft and Remington 
(2015) subsequently referred to this idea as delay theory. Loft and Remington noted that in the 
Einstein and McDaniel (1990) paradigm, not only must the participant remember a new episodic 
PM task, but this less frequent PM task must compete for response selection with the more 
routine ongoing task. They reasoned that PM errors should be reduced if participants are 
provided with more processing time for the less frequent PM response to emerge. To test this, 
Loft and Remington asked participants to withhold their responses until a tone played. The tones 
played at varying delays after stimulus presentation. PM accuracy was improved by delays as 
brief as 0.2s. Heathcote et al. proposed that individuals endogenously implement something akin 
to this response-delay manipulation by raising their threshold to make ongoing task responses, 
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producing PM costs. This functional slowing could result either from a conscious strategy 
change, or an unconscious adaption, based on task experience.  
Comparing Capacity-sharing and Delay Theories 
Distinguishing delay theory from capacity-sharing theories requires a method of separating 
changes in processing speed from response threshold increases. Such a separation is intrinsic to 
evidence accumulation models of the decision process, which assume that evidence accumulates 
at an estimated rate (the drift rate) until it exceeds a certain amount (the response threshold), at 
which time a task response is made (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Capacity-sharing theories assume 
that PM tasks absorb capacity that could otherwise be used to speed up and/or improve the 
accuracy of ongoing task responses (e.g., Einstein et al., 2005; Smith, 2010). Mapping the 
capacity demands of one task (e.g., PM) to increased mean RT on another concurrent task (e.g., 
ongoing) is most consistent with the conceptualisation of capacity as the amount of work the 
cognitive system is able to perform per unit of time (Wenger & Townsend, 2000), which we 
refer to as functional capacity. For example, the PAM theory explicitly attributes PM costs to 
shared attentional resources that are functional to PM retrieval (Smith & Bayen, 2004). Theories 
of attention, almost universally, equate resource allocation with processing speed, regardless of 
whether the models posit a continuous division of resource capacity between two tasks, or a 
single-channel, all-or-none allocation. In resource accounts (Bundesen, 1990; Gobell, Tseng, & 
Sperling, 2004; Kahneman, 1973; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1980) attentional capacity 
is a processing rate multiplier. Evidence accrues in parallel for each of a set of multiple 
concurrent tasks at a rate directly proportional to the amount of capacity allocated to that task. In 
contrast, single-channel bottleneck theories treat resource sharing as iterative sampling, whereby 
a single resource is allocated in rapid succession between a set of current tasks (Pashler, 1984; 
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Welford, 1952). The rate of evidence accumulation for a given task (or channel) is determined by 
the frequency with which attention is allocated to it. In either case, sensory signals, decisions, 
and response selection are speeded in direct proportion to the attentional resources they receive. 
Thus, functional capacity-sharing between the PM task and the ongoing task would be reflected 
in decreased evidence accumulation to the ongoing task. 
Drift rates agree with other measures of functional capacity, such as the nonparametric 
cognitive capacity coefficient provided by Systems Factorial Technology (Eidels, Donkin, 
Brown, & Heathcote, 2010). The capacity coefficient compares performance to a benchmark 
unlimited-capacity independent parallel model in specially designed experimental paradigms, 
and classifies participants’ task performance as either exhibiting super-capacity (more capacity 
when there are two information streams), unlimited capacity (no interference in processing 
between information streams), or limited capacity (interference in processing between 
information streams). Eidels et al. investigated capacity requirements using a redundant target 
paradigm, in which the total amount of work the system must perform is manipulated by 
presenting either single or double targets to participants. LBA drift rates and the capacity 
coefficient agreed in their attribution of individual differences in capacity among participants. 
Donkin et al. (2014) found that LBA rates agreed with Townsend and Altieri (2012)’s accuracy 
adjusted capacity coefficient estimates regarding which accuracy manipulations induced 
increases in threshold and rates, and which selectively induced changes in threshold. Logan et al. 
(2014) found that increasing the array of choice alternatives in a word identification task – and 
hence the demand on capacity due to the need to process each alternative – reduced evidence 
accumulation rates. Sewell, Lilburn and Smith (2016) varied visual load by presenting different 
numbers of concurrent Gabor patch stimuli. They found that manipulation of the set size of 
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stimuli (visual load) altered drift rates. All of these results suggest that functional capacity is well 
measured by drift rates.  
In contrast to capacity-sharing theories, delay theory attributes PM costs to the strategic 
slowing of ongoing task response selection to allow more time for the PM response to reach 
threshold. Consequently, it predicts that PM costs should be caused by changes in response 
criteria, reflected in the response threshold parameters of evidence accumulation models. Thus, 
the delay theory and capacity-sharing theories of costs produce opposing predictions. A finding 
that PM demands significantly affect mean drift rates, with no significant change to threshold, 
provides strong evidence against delay theory. Capacity-sharing theories do not predict that costs 
are solely accounted for by response threshold, as this parameter reflects strategy rather than the 
speed of processing. A finding of threshold changes with no changes in mean drift rate provides 
strong evidence against capacity-sharing.  
Recently (Heathcote et al., 2015; Horn & Bayen, 2015), two evidence accumulation models 
have been fit to PM costs: the Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA) and the Diffusion Decision 
Model (DDM). Heathcote et al. applied the LBA and DDM to three experiments that used 
lexical-decision ongoing tasks. The PM task was to respond to either letter strings of a specific 
colour (non-targets were presented in multiple other colours), or to letter strings that contained a 
specific syllable (e.g., “tor”). Horn and Bayen (2015) reported DDM analyses of four 
experiments. Participants performed a lexical-decision ongoing task. The PM task was to make a 
PM response when items started with specific letters (e.g., G, H or M). In both Heathcote et al. 
and Horn and Bayen, there was no evidence that holding a PM intention decreased average drift 
rates. Instead, there was strong evidence in all seven of the data sets that PM costs were caused 
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by increased response thresholds. These results favour the delay theory of PM costs over 
capacity-sharing theories. 
There is, however, an alternative view of cognitive capacity. It has been proposed that 
another type of capacity drives an overarching executive structure that controls otherwise 
modular processing systems (McVay & Kane, 2012; Unsworth & Spillers, 2010). We refer to 
this as executive capacity. Under this view, the processing speed of any one system (e.g. the 
ongoing task) remains intact as long as the executive system is able to keep the process engaged. 
However, increased load (e.g. as a result of PM) will occasionally exceed the capacity of the 
executive system. The result is a total lapse of attention, during which processing of all tasks is 
halted or drastically slowed. If PM loads executive capacity, then processing speed during PM 
blocks would be the same as in control PM blocks on most non-target trials, but would 
occasionally be much slower due to increased attentional lapses. Thus, PM demands would not 
be expected to have a strong effect on mean PM cost. Instead PM demands would primarily 
affect RT variability via longer RTs during PM-induced attentional lapses (Ihle, Ghisletta, & 
Kliegel, 2016). Similarly, in terms of evidence accumulation parameters, executive capacity load 
should affect drift rate variability, rather than mean drift rate. This view was supported by 
McVay and Kane (2012). They found that the extent to which working memory capacity 
predicted performance of a simple RT task was not strongly mediated by mean drift rate, but was 
mediated both by drift rate variability and subjective reports of attentional lapses. Further, 
Hawkins et al. (2015) demonstrated that when simulated data is mixed from two LBA models, 
one with a drift rate of 1 (regular trials) and one with a drift rate of 0 (lapsed trials), a single LBA 
model captured the mixed data by an increase in the drift rate variability parameter. In one of the 
previously modelled experiments, Heathcote et al. (2015) did find increased variability in drift 
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rates with PM. However, the drift rate variability shift predicted very little of the PM costs. In 
addition, no such increase was found in any other experiments of either Heathcote et al. or Horn 
and Bayen. Thus, there is currently no strong evidence that PM costs are caused by the PM task 
loading executive capacity.  
It has also been argued that capacity-sharing could increase the “non-decision time” 
parameters of evidence accumulation models (Horn & Bayen, 2015). Non-decision time reflects 
the processes that occur in sequence with response selection, such as stimulus encoding and 
motor response production. Horn and Bayen proposed that increased non-decision time may 
reflect the slowing effect of capacity-sharing on encoding time, or it may reflect the time taken 
for sequential PM target check processes (i.e., a target check that occurs either before or after the 
ongoing task decision). However, encoding processes are often data limited, meaning their 
processing rate is determined largely by the quality of the input rather than the allocation of 
resources (Norman & Bobrow, 1975). Further, sequential PM target checking, strictly speaking, 
is not an account that involves competition for cognitive capacity or resources between the 
ongoing task and detection of the PM cue. Rather, it interposes additional cognitive operations 
that occur outside of ongoing task response selection. These putative operations presumably are 
directed at identifying whether the stimulus is the PM cue. Waiting for these operations to 
complete could slow RTs whether or not the operations draw capacity from the ongoing task. 
Thus, to the extent that capacity-sharing theories of costs have considered PM costs as positive 
evidence for capacity-sharing, they predict that PM resource demand slows ongoing task 
processing speed and not non-decision time. Both Horn and Bayen (2015) and Heathcote et al. 
(2015) found evidence that a portion of non-focal PM costs were due to an increase in the non-
decision time parameter. However, non-decision time accounted for a much smaller proportion 
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of costs than threshold. In addition, Heathcote et al. reported increased non-decision time under 
PM conditions for the DDM, but not for the LBA. It was only in Heathcote et al. that both the 
DDM and LBA models were fit, and they found that the LBA produced better fits than the 
DDM, primarily through changes in threshold. This is consistent with simulation showing that 
the DDM mimics LBA threshold increases with increases in both threshold and non-decision 
time (Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, & Wagenmakers, 2011). 
Although existing PM costs modelling has clearly agreed on the critical role of increased 
thresholds, there are differences in the nature of the threshold increases that have been observed. 
Heathcote et al. (2015) found evidence in the data of Lourenço et al. (2013) that ongoing task 
thresholds increase in proportion to the response’s competition with the PM response. Lourenço 
et al. had participants perform a lexical decision task, and some participants were informed that 
the PM target syllable would only appear in word trials. As PM targets were always word trials, 
the word ongoing task response would be much more likely to pre-empt the PM response. There 
was a larger increase in threshold for word responses than for non-word responses. Heathcote et 
al. argued that this selective threshold increase is targeted strategically to increase the probability 
of PM responses on PM trials. In contrast to Heathcote et al., Horn and Bayen (2015) argued that 
threshold increases occur because the PM instructions make the task set appear more complex to 
participants. This view was supported by Horn and Bayen’s fourth experiment, for which they 
reported an equal increase in word and non-word thresholds, despite participants being informed 
that PM items would always be words. The task complexity view suggests a more general 
strategy adjustment, which may or may not be functional to PM.  
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The Current Study 
It is possible that past failures to find decreased drift rates under PM conditions could be 
attributed to the nature of the non-focal PM tasks examined, which have included detecting 
targets of a certain colour, first letter, or containing a particular syllable. Although capacity-
sharing theories have unequivocally attributed costs to capacity-sharing under these conditions 
on the basis of mean RT (Einstein & McDaniel, 2005; Smith, 2010), there is no assurance that 
these represent the kinds of PM demands that would be most likely to drive capacity-sharing 
during stimulus processing. Capacity-sharing theories assume that information about two or 
more tasks could accrue and compete for resources under the same configuration of the cognitive 
system. PM cues defined by a unique colour could lead to detection prior to much evidence 
accumulation on the lexical decision task, consistent with the proposal that colour identification 
occurs at an early stage of processing (Craik, 2002). Initial letters or internal syllable strings 
might also not be the kinds of PM cues for which information would accumulate in parallel with 
the lexical evaluation. In terms of visual attention, lexical processing is optimized around the 
centre of the stimulus (O’regan, Lévy-Schoen, Pynte, & Brugaillère, 1984; Yao-N’Dré, Castet, & 
Vitu, 2013), whereas first letter detection is optimized at the beginning of the stimulus (Scullin, 
McDaniel, Shelton, & Lee, 2010), and syllable detection might require a serial scan of the 
stimulus. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the previous lack of PM interference with evidence 
accumulation will generalize to other PM paradigms. Given the long-standing and widespread 
agreement that non-focal costs are positive evidence of capacity-sharing (McDaniel & Einstein, 
2000; Smith, 2010) it is crucial to ascertain whether the previous lack of drift-rate-driven costs 
will generalize to other PM tasks in which there is a stronger a priori case for capacity-sharing. 
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With this in mind, in the current study our approach was to keep the ongoing task consistent 
with previous studies (lexical decision), but to extend modelling to the costs from the commonly 
used categorical non-focal task (e.g., Dewitt, Hicks, Ball & Knight, 2012; Loft & Humphreys, 
2012; Loft & Remington, 2013; Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2005; Marsh, Hicks, Cook, Hansen, & 
Pallos, 2003; Marsh, Hicks, & Watson, 2002; Meeks, Hicks, & Marsh, 2007; Meeks & Marsh, 
2010), which requires detecting words belonging to target categories, for example remembering 
to make a PM response to any animal word. The categorical PM task requires prolonged 
accumulation of evidence about the meaning of the stimulus (unlike the colour PM task), and the 
same visual analysis as lexical decision (unlike the first letter or the syllable task). As lexical and 
semantic processing are likely to occur in parallel, the PM costs induced by the task may be a 
result of capacity-sharing. This proposition is supported by Marsh et al. (2005), who reported 
that categorical PM accuracy was reduced when participants were instructed to increase their 
lexical decision effort, but that PM accuracy was not affected for the more visual PM task of 
detecting palindromes. This evidence for more capacity-sharing between categorical PM and 
lexical decision was present despite there being a larger mean PM cost for the palindrome task. 
Thus, our categorical PM condition may be more conducive to mean drift rate decreases than the 
tasks previously modelled even if it produces smaller mean RT costs.  
Similarly, the categorical PM task may be more conducive to changes in drift rate variability 
than the previously modelled tasks. This would map to attentional lapses induced by the PM task 
loading executive capacity. The categorical information required to detect PM is presumably 
obtained at later stage of processing than perceptual information, such as stimulus colour. It is 
possible that conflicts at this later stage between the concurrent management of lexical and 
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categorical processing may be particularly taxing for the executive system, leading to more 
lapses of attention and increased drift rate variability.  
Our non-focal PM targets were always words, and this feature of the PM task was 
highlighted in the PM instructions. This allowed us to compare the delay theory view of 
threshold shifts as strategic waiting for PM retrieval (Heathcote et al., 2015), with the view of 
threshold shifts as a reaction to perceived task complexity (Horn & Bayen, 2015). If the 
threshold shift is implemented in order to ensure that the PM response is retrieved on PM trials, 
then participants will become more biased against responding to a word under PM conditions 
(i.e., the word threshold will increase relative to the non-word threshold). In contrast, if the 
threshold shift is not implemented specifically to extend time on PM trials for PM retrieval, then 
threshold shifts may be equal for word and non-word responses.  
We also modelled costs from a focal PM demand to make a PM response to a single target 
word. Focal PM costs can often reach statistical significance (Loft & Remington, 2013), but they 
tend to be much smaller in magnitude than costs caused by non-focal PM demands (Meeks & 
Marsh, 2010). As with non-focal costs, capacity-sharing theories of PM all propose that, when 
focal PM costs are observed, they occur because a proportion of an individual’s available 
capacity (whether actually required for PM retrieval or not) is allocated away from the ongoing 
task and towards the PM task (McDaniel, Umanath, Einstein, & Waldum, 2015; Smith, Hunt, 
McVay, & McConnell, 2007). Delay theory can account for focal PM costs without capacity-
sharing. If thresholds can account for the majority of the larger non-focal PM costs – where the 
PM retrieval is presumably more likely to interfere with evidence accumulation – and not 
account for the majority of the smaller focal PM costs – where the PM interference with 
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evidence accumulation should be minimal – that would be inconsistent with delay theory, and 
would bring into question conclusions drawn from the non-focal modelling.  
In addition, comparison of the focal and non-focal conditions, where two identical PM 
response modes are employed, can reveal the effects of increasing the actual and perceived 
demands of PM target detection. For example, if participants are sensitive to the fact that focal 
PM can be supported by lexical decision processing, the focal PM task may not induce the same 
level of increased perceived task complexity as the non-focal PM task. If this is the case, a global 
threshold shift would be less likely in the focal than in the non-focal condition. Horn and Bayen 
(2015)’s modelling went against this proposition, as they found that focal PM costs were 
accounted for with a global increase in DDM thresholds. However, their focal PM task required 
subjects to make a PM response to any one of three PM target words. Our focal PM task required 
participants to remember to make a response to one single target word, a manipulation more in 
line with the focal PM demand traditionally imposed by researchers when using lexical decision 
tasks (see Einstein & McDaniel, 2010). In contrast to a one-item PM target list, which 
individuals can likely easily hold in focal attention, a memory retrieval operation may well be 
required to access the multiple-target list in order to compare it against each presented letter 
string (Loft, Humphreys, & Whitney, 2008; Öztekin, Davachi, & McElree, 2010). It is, therefore, 
possible that the retrospective memory requirement in the Horn and Bayen study increased 
perceived task complexity, resulting in the global threshold change.  
The current study also permits us to examine the reproducibility and generality of non-
decision time effects. As noted by Horn and Bayen (2015), the degree of target checking may 
depend on task demands. The tasks which have produced non-decision time effects were a first 
letter task, in which the target letter was guaranteed to be presented in a specific visual location 
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(the start of a word), and a syllable detection task. Both may require a visual analysis separate 
from the lexical decision, and thus arguably would encourage non-decision time effects. In the 
current PM task, where parallel accumulation between PM and ongoing responses is more 
plausible, non-decision effects should be less likely. Non-decision effects have to date only been 
found in DDM, which has provided a worse fit than the LBA to PM costs data, suggesting they 
may be a result of model mimicry. Thus, if we do find increased non-decision time, it will be 
crucial to determine whether the result is obtained from the best fitting model architecture.   
Method 
Participants  
Thirty-five participants were tested (21 females), with ages ranging from 17-791 (M = 
25.77). Participants performed three one-hour sessions on separate days. English as a first 
language was required to participate. Participants received either $45 AUD or credit towards 
their first year psychology unit. The study was approved by the University of Western Australia's 
Human Research Ethics Office.  
Materials 
Two thousand one hundred and eighty eight low frequency (occurring 2-6 times per million) 
English words (of length between 4 and 10 characters) were selected from the Sydney Morning 
Herald word database (Dennis, 1995), plus 62 extra words from the MRC 2.00 database (Wilson, 
1988) for a total of 2250 words. A non-word was created from each word by replacing every 
vowel with a random alternate vowel (e.g., chemist to chamust). In addition, 34 low frequency 
                                                 
1 In response to a reviewer who noted our wide age range, we re-ran all analyses in the paper with 
participants older than 40 (of which there were 6) excluded.  The patterns of significance in the conventional results 
were almost identical, as were the models selected and the patterns of significance in the parameter ANOVAs. The 
inclusion vs exclusion of these participants did not influence the interpretation of the results.    
                                                ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE ABOUT PM COSTS 16 
 
words from each of three categories (animal, food, human body part) were selected to be PM 
targets.  
Participants performed 9 blocks of 500 trials: three non-focal, three focal, and three control 
blocks. Participants performed 1 block of each type on each day. Block order was balanced 
across days so that participants would not get a condition in the same position twice. For 
example, if on day 1 a participant had the order focal/non-focal/control then focal would not be 
presented first, non-focal not presented second and control not presented third on day 2 or 3. 
There are 12 day orders that satisfy these conditions (e.g., day 1 – focal/non-focal/control, day 2- 
non-focal/control/focal, day 3- control/focal/non-focal), and these orders were approximately 
counterbalanced over the final 35 participants.  
Under non-focal conditions, participants were presented with 250 non-words, 217 non-target 
words and 33 target words from one of the target categories (e.g., 33 different animal words). 
Under control conditions, participants were presented with 250 non-words and 250 words. Under 
focal conditions, participants were presented with 250 non-words, 217 non-target words and 1 
target word (e.g., ‘giraffe’) was presented 33 times. Each target category was in one non-focal 
block for each participant. For each participant, one focal target word was drawn randomly from 
each of the target categories (without replacement; each word was only used as a focal target for 
one participant), and if a word was to be presented as a target in the focal block then it was not 
presented in the non-focal blocks for that participant. The assignment of target category to each 
day’s non-focal block, and of which target category the word from the focal block was drawn, 
was random (without replacement) except that the focal word for a given day was never from the 
non-focal PM category for that day. The order of non-target stimuli was randomized. Under PM 
conditions, one target was presented in a random position once every 15 trials, starting from 
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trials 6-20. Thus, 33 trials of the 500 trials in each block were PM targets. Target trials were 
separated by at least 2 non-targets. To balance against any general effect of word repetition in the 
focal condition, one word in the control condition was repeated 33 times according to PM target 
position rules for approximately half the participants. The order of the PM stimuli assigned to the 
PM target positions in the non-focal blocks was random.  
Procedure 
For the lexical decision task, participants were instructed that they would be presented with 
letter strings and to press a key to indicate whether strings were words or non-words as quickly 
and as accurately as possible (the assignment of the keys ‘f’ and ‘j’ to word and non-word 
responses was approximately counterbalanced). Under PM conditions, participants were also 
instructed to press the ‘9’ key instead of the word response when they were presented targets (a 
specific target word for focal PM, or a member of a specific category for non-focal PM). Under 
control conditions, participants were instructed that they only needed to make lexical decision 
responses for that block. Each trial began with a fixation cross ‘+’, displayed in white on a black 
background for 0.5s. The fixation cross was then replaced by a blank screen for 0.25s, which was 
followed by a white letter string that remained on the black screen until the participant 
responded. Each day, participants first completed 20 practice lexical decision trials. Participants 
were then presented with either the focal, non-focal or control instructions. Participants then 
completed a three-minute distractor puzzle, after which they began their first block of trials. In 
between blocks participants rested for two minutes. After each block had been completed, 
participants were instructed to disregard the instructions from the previous block. 
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Results 
In addition to stimulus type (word, non-word) and condition (focal, non-focal, control) the 
analyses included a day factor (day 1, day 2, day 3) to capture the potential effects of task 
repetition. The first two trials of each block were excluded, as were trials where RTs were very 
fast (<0.2s) or very slow (> mean RT plus 3 times the interquartile range / 1.349, which is a 
robust equivalent to a mean +3 SD cutoff). This resulted in the exclusion of 5.22% of non-target 
trials and 3.66% of PM trials. One of the 35 participants was excluded from all analyses because 
they completely neglected non-word responding under PM conditions (no non-word responses 
over 3000 trials). We also excluded a total of eight blocks (that came from four participants) 
because accuracy was near chance (<60%), suggesting a guessing strategy. Another block (from 
one of the same four participants) was excluded because the participant made a PM response to 
20/32 repeats of a stimulus in a control block, suggesting they mistakenly deduced that it was a 
focal PM block. The exclusion of these 9 blocks of trials resulted in the removal of 2.2% of the 
remaining data.  
We had to exclude the four participants with missing blocks from LBA and DDM fitting, 
which require a balanced data structure. Overall then, the LBA and DDM was fit to 30 
participants out of the 35 participants tested, resulting in a 14% participant exclusion rate. This 
exclusion rate is higher than typical, and likely driven by the unusually large number of trials 
participants had to complete over three days of testing. The supplementary materials contain 
conventional analysis of the 30 participant data set to which we fit the DDM and LBA, which 
produces a similar pattern of results to analysis of the full data set.  
 In text we report the results of analysis on the full data set (N = 34), which we achieved by 
using random-effects models that are robust to the presence of missing cells in the data structure. 
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Response accuracies (both PM error rates and lexical decision error rates) were analysed using a 
generalized linear model with a binomial probit link function. For PM analysis, the dependent 
variable for the probit model was the presence versus absence of a PM response on each PM 
trial. For the ongoing task analysis, the dependent variable for the probit model was lexical 
decision accuracy. We analysed RTs using a general linear model with the dependent variable 
mean correct RT. The random-effects model results are tabulated in the supplementary materials, 
and the pattern of significant effects are reported in the body of the text below. Within-subject 
standard errors, both in text and in the graphs, were calculated using the Morey (2008) bias 
corrected method. 
Prospective Memory Task 
PM responses were scored as correct if the participant pressed the PM response key instead 
of a lexical decision response key on the target trial. PM accuracy was higher in the focal 
condition (M = 80%, SE = 3%), than the non-focal condition (M = 58%, SE = 3%), and 
decreased over days (day 1 M = 77%, SE = 3%; day 2 M= 70%, SE = 3%; day 3 M = 60%, SE = 
4%). Correct PM responses were faster in the focal condition (M = 0.795s, SE = 0.021s) than the 
non-focal condition (M = 0.916s, SE = 0.024s). The PM false alarm rate was 0.17% (ranging 
from 0 to 0.5% across participants). 
Lexical Decision Task 
PM target trials, false alarms and the two lexical decision trials following each target trial or 
false alarm were excluded. Trials in which participants were presented repeated non-targets in 
the control condition and the two trials following were also excluded. Lexical decision accuracy 
was higher for non-words (93.3%) than for words (91.7%), and decreased over days (day 1 M = 
93.9%, SE =0.9%; day 2 M= 92.2%, SE = 1.1%; day 3 M= 91.3%, SE = 1.1%). There was an 
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interaction between PM condition and stimulus type (see Figure 1).  Planned comparisons 
suggested there was not a difference between non-focal non-word accuracy (93.4%) compared to 
control non-word accuracy (92.5%), t (33) = 1.46, p = 0.15, but there was a difference for focal 
non-word accuracy (93.8%) compared to control non-word accuracy, t (33) = 3.07, p < 0.01, d = 
0.53. Non-focal word accuracy (91.8%) was not significantly different to control word accuracy 
(91.9%), t (33) = 0.73, p = 0.47, but there was a difference between focal word accuracy (91.3%) 
and control word accuracy, t (33) = 2.18, p < 0.05, d = 0.37.   
Lexical decision response times decreased over days (day 1 M = 0.695s, SE = 0.015s; day 2 
M = 0.645s, SE =0.010s; day 3 M = 0.625s, SE =0.010s), and this effect interacted with stimulus 
type. There was an effect of PM condition (non-focal M = 0.672s, focal M = 0.651s, control M = 
0.644s), which interacted with the effect of stimulus type (Figure 2). Word RTs were slower in in 
non-focal blocks (0.682s) compared to control blocks (0.633s), t (33) = 5.15, p < 0.001, d = 1.24, 
and in focal blocks (0.653s) compared to control blocks, t (33) = 3.24, p < 0.01, d = 0.56. Non-
word RTs were not significantly different between non-focal blocks (0.662s) and control blocks 
(0.654s), t (33) = 1.14, p = 0.26, or between focal blocks (0.649s) and control blocks, t < 1.  
LBA Analysis 
The LBA provided a substantially better account of the data than the DDM, both in terms of 
the AIC and BIC selected models. In fact, even a very simple LBA – one that accounts for all the 
effects of practice and PM condition in threshold (see Table 1, 16 parameters per participant) –  
had a lower deviance than the top DDM model (48 parameters per participant). Qualitatively, the 
DDM consistently under-predicted error rates to word stimuli, even for the most flexible DDM. 
Thus, we focus on inference from the LBA fits. The details of the DDM analysis can be found in 
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supplementary materials, and the implications of the DDM analysis are addressed in the 
discussion section.  
The LBA proposes that evidence accumulates separately for each response over time, and 
the response made is the first to accrue evidence that reaches its threshold (Figure 2). Each 
accumulator begins a decision trial with a starting amount of evidence drawn from the uniform 
distribution [0, A]. Evidence increases at a speed given by the drift rate, which is drawn from a 
normal distribution with mean v and standard deviation sv, until it reaches a threshold b. The first 
accumulator to reach the threshold decides the response, and the time taken to make the response 
is decided by the time taken to reach the threshold plus a non-decision time constant t0. The drift 
rate parameters v and sv reflect processing efficiency and capacity, as well as stimulus features, 
with higher rates indicating more efficient processing of response-relevant stimulus features. 
Better task performance (increased speed and accuracy) can be achieved with high drift rates 
towards the correct response and lower drift rates towards the error response. Threshold reflects 
the caution to make a response, with a higher threshold corresponding to a shift in bias against 
making a response, which is expressed by decreased response frequency and slower responses. 
Threshold increases for all responses yields increases in both RTs and accuracy. We report 
threshold in terms of B (B = b- A). Non-decision time (t0) reflects the time taken for processes 
such as the encoding of stimulus and response production, and thus non-decision time increases 
will increase RTs with no effects on response frequency. 
In addition to the day factor, the PM condition factor, and the stimulus type factor reported 
in our conventional analyses, the LBA results described below include a response factor and 
correspondence factor. The response factor allows parameters to vary by the specific 
accumulator (e.g., participants may be biased against word responding, with a higher B for the 
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word accumulator), and thus can be either ‘word’ or ‘non-word’. The correspondence factor 
varies as a function of whether the response accumulator is ‘correct’ for a stimulus (e.g., to 
capture better than chance accuracy, v is higher for correct responses than incorrect responses). 
We sequentially fit different parameterizations of the LBA as described in Donkin, Brown and 
Heathcote (2011), building to a most complex “top” model, that we allowed to be highly flexible 
but included some reasonable restrictions for the sake of reducing computational effort. As B is 
assumed to be set prior to onset of the stimulus, in the LBA top model it is fixed over stimulus 
type but can vary over the response factor. In order to test the delay theory, B was also free to 
vary over condition, and in order to capture practice effects it was free to vary over days. 
Following previous applications of the LBA, including Heathcote et al. (2015), we only 
estimated one value for start point noise parameter A (i.e., it did not vary over condition, day, or 
response).  
In order to test capacity-sharing theories, the top model allowed the mean drift rate 
parameter v to vary over stimulus type, condition, day and correspondence. The sv parameter 
could vary over the correspondence factor (correct vs incorrect response). It could also vary 
across PM conditions, in order to test for PM-induced attention lapses (i.e., PM load on 
executive capacity). The sv for the false accumulator in the control condition was fixed at 1, as a 
scaling parameter. The sv parameter was fixed over the day factor. Non-decision time t0 was free 
to vary over condition, stimulus and day, but fixed between responses, as is conventional when 
fitting the LBA. With this top model, our sequential model fitting resulted in 11,265 model fits 
per subject, for a total of 337,950 fits.  
Model parameter values were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (Myung, 
2003). The summed log likelihood of all trials was maximised. The deviance, our measure of 
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quality of fit, is equal to two times the negative maximised log likelihood. Table 1 shows our 
model selection results. For model selection we used the AIC and BIC criteria (Myung & Pitt, 
1997), which attempt to select models that provide a good trade-off between minimizing the 
number of parameters (p) and minimizing the deviance2. AIC was calculated for each individual 
subject by applying the penalty term 2p to the deviance. The group AIC was calculated by 
summing together the participant AICs. The group BIC was calculated by summing the 
deviances across participants, then applying the penalty term P × log(N) to the summed deviance 
(where N and P are the total number of observations and parameters summed over participants).  
The AIC selected model retained full flexibility for B, but dropped the PM condition factor 
for both v and sv, and dropped both the PM condition and stimulus factors for t0.  The BIC 
selected model dropped the response factor for B, and both the condition and day factors for v 
and t0. In contrast to the AIC model, the stimulus factor was retained for t0. The AIC model did 
not fit significantly worse than the top model, 2(1290) = 486, p > 0.999, but the BIC model did, 
2(1830) = 9477, p < 0.001. Thus, the AIC model results are reported in text and details of the 
BIC model results are reported in supplementary materials. The AIC-selected LBA predictions 
are plotted in Figure 3. For our parameter analyses we report the results obtained from the AIC-
selected LBA model. 
AIC LBA Parameter Analysis 
For estimates of B (Figure 4), a response by PM condition by day ANOVA indicated a main 
effect of response, F (1, 29) = 4.62, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .14, with higher B for word responding (1.076) 
than non-word responding (1.034). This suggests a bias against responding ‘word’. There was 
                                                 
2 We also calculated model weights (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004) for all of our selected models, which revealed 
conditional probabilities for near one for the selected models, and conditional probability near 0 for the top model. 
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also a main effect of PM condition, F (2, 58) = 34.39,  = .87, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .54 (control B = 
1.018, focal B= 1.047, non-focal B = 1.101), and B decreased over days (day 1= 1.174, day 2= 
1.020, day 3= 0.972), F (2, 58) = 17.32,  = .96, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .37. The effect of response 
interacted with condition, F (2, 58) = 29.62,  = .85, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .51. Planned contrasts 
revealed differences in B estimates for the word accumulator under focal conditions (1.184) 
compared to control conditions (1.108), t (29) = 4.79, p < .001, d = 0.87, but not for the non-
word accumulator (focal B = 1.153, control B = 1.139), t < 1. In the non-focal condition, 
estimates of B were higher than control for both words (1.251), t (29) = 8.60, p < .001, d = 1.57, 
and non-words (1.207), t (29) = 3.77, p < .001, d = 0.69. The increase in B under non-focal 
conditions compared to control was larger for words than for non-words, t (29) = 6.59, p < .001, 
d = 1.20. These contrasts suggest a selective threshold effect in both PM conditions; that is, bias 
against responding word increased compared to control. The selective threshold effect was larger 
in the non-focal condition; that is, the shift in bias against responding word (as compared to 
control) was significantly higher under non-focal conditions than under focal conditions, t (29) = 
3.50, p < .01, d = 0.64.  There was also an interaction between response type and day, F (2, 58) = 
9.25,  = .83, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .24, with B decreasing more over days for non-words than for 
words, (day l non-word M = 1.17, SE = 0.032 ; day 1 word M = 1.181, SE = 0.031; day 2 non-
word M = 0.995, SE = 0.027; day 2 word M = 1.045, SE = 0.031; day 3 non-word M = 0.940, SE 
= 0.026; day 3 word M = 1.003, SE = 0.024). This is consistent with participants learning that 
they can lower their non-word threshold without increasing PM errors (i.e. learning over days to 
be increasingly biased against word responding). However, there was no 3-way interaction 
between this effect and PM condition, F (4, 116) = 1.59, p = .18. There was also no interaction 
between day and condition (F < 1).  
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The model selection indicated no effect of PM condition on either mean drift rate, v, or 
variability in drift rates, sv. For v, a stimulus type by day by correspondence ANOVA indicated a 
main effect of stimulus type, F (1, 29) = 6.56, p <.05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .18, with word rates (M = 0.806, SE = 
0.344) higher than non-word rates (M = 0.741, SE = 0.351). As expected with better than chance 
accuracy, there was an effect of correspondence, F (1, 29) = 182.79, p <.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .86, with 
correct rates (M = 2.010, SE = 0.130) higher than error rates (-0.463, SE = 0.140). For sv, there 
was a significant effect of correspondence, with variability in rates lower for correct responses 
(M = 0.445, SE = 0.018) than for incorrect responses (which were fixed at 1), F (1, 29) = 481.55, 
p <.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .94. 
The model selection indicated no effect of PM demands, or stimulus type, affecting non-
decision time, t0. There was an effect of day, F (2, 58) = 3.60,  = .97, p <.05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11, with t0 
increasing on later days (day 1 M = 0.069, SE = 0.007; day 2 M = 0.087, SE = 0.006; day 3 M = 
0.092, SE = 0.006). 
In order to assess the individual differences in our observed effects, we plotted the top 
model parameters that can directly contribute to the magnitude of PM costs (non-decision time, 
mean drift rate, variability in drift rate and response threshold) on a per-subject basis (see 
supplementary materials). Corroborating our model selection, there was a remarkably consistent 
picture of null mean drift rate effects, with minimal non-decision time and drift rate variability 
effects. In contrast, PM threshold effects were common, particularly for the word threshold. For 
example, for a little less than half the participants the non-focal threshold increases were visibly 
larger for word thresholds than for non-word thresholds, whereas for no participants were the 
non-word threshold increases appreciably larger than word threshold increases. 
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Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to investigate the latent variables that underlie costs 
induced by categorical non-focal PM task demands and by focal PM task demands. Costs were 
observed under non-focal conditions (mean RTs were 0.04s larger than control), and were 
present but smaller under focal PM conditions compared to control conditions (0.01s). Costs 
were larger for correct word responses (non-focal = 0.058s, focal = 0.024s), which were the 
greatest competitor with the PM response, than for correct non-word responses (non-focal = 
0.022s, focal = -0.002s).  
The modelling results extend Heathcote et al. (2015) and Horn and Bayen (2015) by 
unambiguously finding no effect of PM conditions on mean drift rates. This applied for both our 
single target focal task and our categorical non-focal task. To date then, there has been a failure 
to find drift rate driven PM costs in the modelling of eight data sets, which used four 
conceptually different non-focal PM tasks, and two focal PM tasks. Given the accruing 
consistency of the null mean drift rate effects, arguments for capacity-sharing would need to 
disavow any link between mean drift rates and capacity. However, this goes against the almost 
universally accepted link between processing speed and capacity in theories of attention 
(Bundesen, 1990; Gobell, Tseng, & Sperling, 2004; Kahneman, 1973; Navon & Gopher, 1979; 
Wickens, 1980), as well as empirical evidence supporting that link (Donkin et al., 2014; Eidels et 
al., 2010; Sewell et al., 2016). Moreover, if the effects of capacity-sharing were somehow split 
between threshold changes and drift rate, then it is likely at least one of the eight modelled 
studies would have found some evidence for a mean drift rate effect, but none have. It is not 
clear what other parameters the claims of the capacity-sharing theories could correspond to. They 
certainly do not predict that costs would be entirely threshold-driven, as this parameter reflects 
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response strategy and preference rather than resource allocation. Although non-decision time 
could be extended by a capacity demanding process, a non-decision time prediction is 
inconsistent with the proposal that costs are positive evidence for capacity-sharing, as there is no 
way to identify whether the processes which extend non-decision time are capacity consuming or 
not. Thus, the modelling evidence to date strongly ties PM costs in ongoing task RTs to increases 
in response thresholds underlying more cautious responding, and fails to provide any support for 
capacity-sharing during processing.  
There are two points worth noting about what the null drift rate finding does not imply. 
First, the current findings do not rule out the existence of PM tasks that do require capacity 
sharing between ongoing tasks and PM tasks. The costs effects have only been modelled in 
paradigms in which the information required for PM retrieval is simple and available in the same 
general spatial location as the information required for ongoing task decisions. The previously 
modelled tasks include the canonical laboratory demonstrations of PM capacity sharing, but it 
may be that capacity sharing only occurs when there is a need to sample spatially separated 
information sources. One example would be an air traffic control task in which the PM task 
requires responding to an aircraft ‘callsign’ property that has no relevance to aircraft conflict 
detection, and is in a completely separate visual location from the conflict detection information, 
where it would be unlikely to be processed at all without the PM requirement (Loft, 2014). It 
seems likely in this case that switching attention between the stimuli for the two distinct tasks 
could affect the rate of evidence accumulation for the ongoing conflict detection task.  
The second point is that the current findings do not imply that the PM task requires no 
cognitive capacity at all. Our model is limited to explaining PM costs, and hence can only 
provide insight into PM processes to the extent that changes in ongoing task response decision 
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processes in response to PM task demands can be mapped to PM response decision processes. 
PM task may require cognitive capacity that is not shared with the ongoing task. Testing this 
would require a model that includes a process account of the PM task decision. The PM process 
could, for example, be modelled in an LBA computational architecture as a third, additional, 
evidence accumulator, that occurs in parallel with the two ongoing task accumulators.  
The null effect on ongoing task drift rates extended not just to mean drift rates, but also to 
drift rate variability. Thus, there was a lack of evidence for PM induced attentional lapses. To 
date then, model-based evidence for PM induced attentional lapsing has only been found in one 
experiment out of eight (Heathcote et al., 2015; Horn & Bayen, 2015). This suggests that, in the 
modelled ongoing tasks, the burden of PM on executive capacity has been fairly limited. This is 
ostensibly inconsistent with previous studies indicating that taxing the executive control system 
can produce PM decrements (e.g., Marsh & Hicks, 1998), and studies showing that working 
memory is correlated with PM accuracy (e.g. Smith & Bayen, 2005). We can think of two 
reasons for this apparent contradiction. Firstly, although it is often assumed that capacity-sharing 
processes are common to both PM target trials and non-target trials, they may not be. For 
example, executive capacity may only be required to perform the PM retrieval process when 
triggered by the PM target, or to coordinate the PM response procedure. To date we do not know 
of a study that can disentangle the executive requirements of non-target trials from the executive 
requirements of PM target trials. Our analysis included only PM costs to non-target trials, 
whereas previous analyses of working memory and PM accuracy did not include a parallel 
analysis of PM costs. Secondly, it is possible that executive capacity affects the PM related 
processes that occur on non-target trials without being significantly strained by those processes. 
For example, executive capacity may be used to adjust thresholds to meet PM task demands. In 
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this case, individuals with lower executive capacity (e.g. lower working memory span, imposed 
working memory load) may fail to increase their thresholds in PM blocks, or fail to increase their 
thresholds selectively when PM instructions are stimulus-specific. If executive capacity tends 
only to be engaged to modify thresholds when executive capacity is available, this could explain 
why PM tasks appear not to induce attentional lapses, which would require overloading the 
executive system.  
We found that non-focal PM costs were driven by increased response thresholds. This 
supports the delay theory of PM costs, which proposes that PM costs reflect a strategy of waiting 
for potential PM retrieval. The best fitting model (LBA) suggested that both the word and non-
word thresholds increased. This is consistent with the proposition by Horn and Bayen (2015) that 
PM instructions can cause a more generally cautious approach due to an increase in perceived 
task complexity. In contrast to the predictions of Horn and Bayen’s complexity account, we also 
observed that our non-focal threshold increases were higher for the word response. This selective 
shift suggests that threshold increases may be targeted particularly at modifying the response 
selection on PM trials. As word accumulation is the most competitive with PM response 
selection (because PM items are also words), this threshold increase would be responsible for the 
majority of the delay on PM trials. However, note that the BIC selected LBA did not include a 
selective shift for word responding (for either PM condition). We reported the AIC model, 
because the model was no worse in fit than the top model, whereas the BIC model was 
statistically inferior in fit to the top model. One weakness of the AIC model is that it over-
predicted error rates to word trials in non-focal blocks, whereas the BIC model did not. This 
could have occurred because the AIC model included a stronger bias against word responding 
than was actually present in the data. 
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Focal PM costs were also entirely threshold driven, supporting the delay theory, but they 
differed in two regards from the non-focal PM costs. First, in the focal blocks, the word 
threshold increased but the non-word threshold did not. This suggests that focal PM instructions 
did not increase the overall perception of task complexity. This result contrasts with the previous 
model of focal PM costs presented by Horn and Bayen (2015), in which both thresholds 
increased. However, their focal PM task was more complex than ours. Our task used a single-
target focal PM requirement, whereas Horn and Bayen required participants to respond to any 
word from a previously encoded three-item list. Perhaps the higher retrospective memory load of 
the Horn and Bayen focal PM task caused an increase in perceived task complexity.  
A higher retrospective memory load might also have contributed to the larger caution 
increase in our non-focal condition compared to the focal condition. In the single target focal 
task each PM cue is identical to the target and reinforces its representation in memory directly. 
This is not the case for our non-focal cues where there is an indirect activation of the category 
node by the cue. Note that both increases in threshold due to retrospective memory load and 
increases due to task complexity are not a priori features of delay theory. Thus, it seems that, 
although the selective delay of ongoing task responses to enable PM responses does occur, it 
occurs in the context of a wider range of PM task-related processes. 
The second difference between the focal model and non-focal models is that the word 
threshold increases were smaller overall in the focal case. Assuming that focal PM retrieval is 
faster than non-focal retrieval, this would follow from the delay theory. A faster focal PM 
retrieval means that less response delay is required for the PM response to out-race the word 
response. This faster PM retrieval may owe to the activation of spontaneous retrieval processes, 
as specified in the Multiprocess view (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).  
                                                ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE ABOUT PM COSTS 31 
 
To the extent that threshold increases were not selective to word thresholds, they cannot be 
attributed purely to delay theory. Although group model selection favoured a selective threshold 
increase in both non-focal and focal conditions, an examination of individual differences (see 
supplementary materials) suggests that the pattern did not hold for all participants. About half of 
our participants disproportionately increased their word threshold in non-focal conditions, but the 
remainder raised both thresholds equally. This heterogeneity in the extent of selective versus 
general threshold increases may have driven the aforementioned miss-fit of the AIC model to 
non-focal word accuracy. Perhaps the benefit of the selective delay strategy is not immediately 
obvious to participants, either because the stimulus-specific nature of the PM task was not salient 
at encoding time, or because consideration was not given to the underlying dynamics of 
decision-making which would occur on PM trials. Such a difference might explain why some 
studies find stimulus-specific instructions cause selective costs and other studies find costs to 
both word and non-word trial types (e.g., Cohen, Jaudas, Hirschhorn, Sobin, & Gollwitzer, 2012; 
Horn & Bayen, 2015).  
If the selective delay strategy is indeed optimal, then extended experience with the PM task 
might encourage it. Consistent with this possibility, we observed that the bias against word 
responses increased over the days of the experiment. Although the same trend was observed in 
the control condition, where the word response does not compete with a PM response, this could 
be caused by within-subjects carryover effects (Poulton, 1982) from the PM blocks. As there 
were two PM blocks (focal and non-focal) for each control block, the PM delay strategy might 
persist into control blocks. 
There were no changes in non-decision time across conditions with the LBA. However, 
the DDM accounted for a sizeable portion of costs with increased non-decision time: non-
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decision time was equal in size to the entirety of focal PM costs (0.010s), and about half of non-
focal PM costs (0.022s). One interpretation of this effect is that it reflects capacity-sharing 
between a PM process and stimulus encoding and/or response production processing. Another 
interpretation of the effect is that it reflects a sequential target check. That is, detection of the PM 
cue could require capacity-demanding operations that occur after response selection on the 
lexical decision task but prior to response execution. Consequently, if the non-decision time 
account of our costs is accepted then our conclusions are confined to the issue of shared capacity 
during processing. There is also the strong possibility that the non-decision time increases are an 
artefact of the particular assumptions of the DDM. This interpretation is supported by the 
superior fit of the LBA, and previous findings that in simulations LBA threshold increases can 
cause increases in both threshold and non-decision time in the DDM (Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, 
et al., 2011). 
During the review process some concerns were raised over the fact that our PM 
instruction told participants to make the PM response instead of the word response. This 
instruction is similar to the more common instruction used in the PM literature for participants to 
make the PM response when the target is presented (e.g. Einstein & McDaniel, 2005; Scullin et 
al., 2010; Smith & Bayen, 2004). An alternative type of instruction is to explicitly tell the 
participant to make the ongoing task response before the PM response (Hicks, Marsh, & Cook, 
2005; Loft et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2005). The latter instruction might allow participants to 
remember to make their PM response after they make their ongoing task decision, rendering 
threshold increases less useful for PM. However, Heathcote et al. (2015) found a similar pattern 
of results to the current study when they modelled a task with the instruction to make the 
ongoing task response before the PM response: selective threshold increases accounted for PM 
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cost. These threshold increases may reduce PM errors because terminating stimulus processing 
to make an ongoing task response interrupts processing of the stimulus features required to detect 
the PM target (after the ongoing task response is made, the stimulus is removed from the 
display).  
In summary, PM costs induced by both a single-target focal PM task and a categorical 
non-focal task were driven by changes in response thresholds, rather than mean drift rates, 
supporting the delay theory of PM costs over capacity-sharing theories. Both the word and non-
word thresholds increased in our non-focal PM condition, but the increase in the word threshold 
was larger. This selective threshold increase in favour of PM responding supports the delay 
theory, which states that thresholds increase in order to allow time for the detection of the PM 
target. However, threshold increases were not entirely selective to the word accumulator for the 
non-focal PM task, and this suggests the involvement of additional mechanisms that are not 
included in delay theory. It cannot be ascertained from the current data what those mechanisms 
are, but possibilities include increases in the perceived task complexity of the PM instructions, 
and increases retrospective memory load. In contrast, our AIC selected model suggests that 
under focal conditions, selective word threshold increases accounted for the entirety of PM costs. 
Finally, we found no evidence of a change in drift rate variability that would signify that the PM 
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Table 1. LBA model selection. Model factors include condition (PM), stimulus type (S), day (D), response (R) 
and correspondence (C).   
 
Model B v sv  t0 p Deviance AIC BIC 
Top Model R, PM, D S, PM, D, C PM, C S, PM, D 2340 -92812 -88132 -65744 
AIC Model R, PM, D S, D, C C D 1050 -92328 -90228 -80182 
BIC Model PM, D S, C C S 510 -89234 -88214 -83335 
Threshold 
LBA 
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Figure 1. Panel 1. Mean accuracy by stimulus type by condition. Panel 2. Mean correct RT by stimulus type 
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RT = Accumulation time+ t0 
  





Figure 3. LBA AIC selected model fits to error rates (left column), RT distribution for 
correct responses (10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles, middle column) and the 50th 
percentile (median) for error responses. Error bars calculated using the Morey (2008) 
bias-corrected method. 
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Figure 4. Mean B by stimulus type condition. Error bars calculated using the Morey (2008) bias-
corrected method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
